From cyber-security deception to manipulation and gratification through gamification by Bellekens, Xavier et al.
From Cyber-Security Deception To
Manipulation and Gratification Through
Gamification
Xavier Bellekens1, Gayan Jayasekara1, Hanan Hindy1, Miroslav Bures1,3,
David Brosset2, Christos Tachtatzis4 and Robert Atkinson4
1 Abertay University, Division of Cyber-Security, Scotland
2 Chair of Naval Cyber Defense, Ecole navale, France
3 Czech Technical University in Prague, Dpt. of Computer Science, Faculty of
Electrical Engineering, Czech Republic
4 University of Strathclyde, Dpt. of Electronic & Electrical Engineering, Scotland
Abstract. With the ever growing networking capabilities and services
offered to users, attack surfaces have been increasing exponentially, ad-
ditionally, the intricacy of network architectures has increased the com-
plexity of cyber-defenses, to this end, the use of deception has recently
been trending both in academia and industry. Deception enables to cre-
ate proactive defense systems, luring attackers in order to better defend
the systems at hand. Current applications of deception, only rely on
static, or low interactive environments. In this paper we present a plat-
form that combines human-computer-interaction, analytics, gamification
and deception to lure malicious users into selected traps while piquing
their interests. Furthermore we analyse the interactive deceptive aspects
of the platform through the addition of a narrative, further engaging
malicious users into following a predefined path and deflecting attacks
from key network systems.
Keywords: Deception · Cyber-Security · Manipulation · Interactive De-
fense
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades the field of cyber-security has experienced numerous
changes associated with the evolution of neighboring fields, such as network-
ing, mobile communications, and recently the Internet of Things (IoT) [7] [14].
Changes in mindsets have also been witnessed, a couple of years ago the cyber-
security industry blamed users for their mistakes often depicted as the num-
ber one reason behind security breaches. Nowadays, companies are empowering
users, modifying their perception of being the weak link, into being the center-
piece of security design [9]. Users are by definition “in control” and therefore
a cyber-security asset. Researchers have focused on the gamification of cyber-
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and threats, allowing them to become the first line of defense to report anoma-
lies [21]. However, over the past years numerous infrastructures have suffered
from malicious intent, data breaches, and crypto-ransomeware, clearly demon-
strating the technical “know-how” of hackers and their ability to bypass the
security measures in place [12] [13].
Researchers concentrated on the gamification, learning and teaching theory of
cyber-security to end-users in numerous fields through various techniques and
scenarios to raise end-user cyber-situational awareness [2][1]. While empowering
the end-users, researchers overlooked hackers, and the potential of using hacker
gamification to benefit cyber-security. In this paper, we argue that there is an
endemic issue in the understanding of hacking practices leading to vulnerable de-
vices, software and architectures. We therefore propose a gamification platform
for hackers. The platform is designed with hacker user-interaction and deception
in mind.
The contributions of this paper are threefold:
– Deceptive Interactive Techniques are proposed and defined. This can be
transposed to other systems to increase the interactivity of deception sys-
tems.
– An Interactive Deceptive Based Platform is presented. The platform is able
to deploy scenarios to engage and deceive malicious users in different con-
texts.
– Deceptive narrative scenarios based on gamification are presented and eval-
uated. The narrative enables to engage the malicious user to further explore
the deceptive scenarios and safeguards key elements of the network.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 discusses tech-
niques to engage malicious users through Gamification, Narrative, Manipulation
and Gratification. Section 3 introduces the interactive deception platform and its
components, followed by Section 4 which discusses 3 different scenarios to eval-
uate the interactivity and deceptiveness of the platform. Furthermore, Section 5
discusses the results obtained through the different scenarios, Section 6 highlight
the related works, Section 7 discusses the key takeaways from the platform and
its limitations and the paper concludes with Section 8.
2 Interactive Deception Based Defenses
The premise of this research assumes that all networks are vulnerable. This
premise is extended to the belief that the attack surface grows alongside the
number of devices connected to the network and the applications installed.
Defending large attack surfaces is cumbersome and requires extensive mainte-
nance. While IDS, Firewalls and other security appliances enable a high degree
of protection and are key to enhance the overall security of a network, they
may also contain vulnerabilities, hence, further increasing the attack surface [4].
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Fig. 1. Inner Architecture of the Deception Framework
Deception-based defenses on the other hand enable a system to trick or mislead
an attacker to perform (or not) an action. Two of the most widely accepted
definition of deception applied to cyber-security are provided by Yuill [20] and
Almeshekah and Spafford [1]. In their manuscript, Almeshekah and Spafford dis-
cuss the addition of “confusion” to the widely accepted definition provided by
Yuill. In this paper we argue, that deception and confusion in cyber-security
is best achieved, through human computer interaction. Static systems, such as
described in literature [18] [10] often fail to meet the definitions aforementioned.
We further argue that high interaction environments are key to deceptive de-
fenses. Low interaction deceptive environments fail to mimic the behaviour of
virtualised systems, furthermore, they fail to provide malicious user with a viable
challenge and hence, limiting the usefulness of such systems [17]. Our platform,
while providing a fully interactive system, further extends this by building upon
gamification techniques and story telling (narrative), intrinsically, providing an
immersive environment to the malicious user similar to video games.
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2.1 Gamification
Interactive defences, such as honeypots, are often based on real or virtualised
systems logging interaction information and queries made by malicious users.
While honeypots are effective at detecting and deflecting cyber-attacks or creat-
ing malware zoo, their deceptive action is often seen as a secondary purpose [16].
Furthermore, while enabling interaction honeypots are not designed to coerce
the user into further interacting with it. To this end, we challenged the defini-
tion of high interaction honeypots, by combining high interaction environments
with gamification techniques, coercing malicious users into participating in an
unknown (to the malicious user) challenge. A generally accepted definition of
gamification is provided by Deterding et al. as “The use of game design ele-
ments in non-game contexts” [8]. The gamification and design techniques used
within the interactive deception platform are derived from [5].
Game Mechanics act as building blocks, for example, the scoring systems, badges
and trophies enable the user to rank himself and foster the motivation of the user
to perform better. In the platform, the scoring system is enabled by providing
the user with the ability to compare his achievements against planted hacker
achievements [5].
Gamification and Game Mechanics must be tightly coupled with a game nar-
rative in order to provide best results and ensure immersion.
2.2 Narrative
In order to foster interaction with the deception platform , the platform builds on
an attack narrative, additionally to the gamification techniques used. The narra-
tive enables to construct a causal, logical and chronological chain of events, nec-
essary to the high interaction capabilities of the platform. Barthes [3] described
events critical to the coherence of the story as “cardinal functions”. Cardinal
functions play an important role within story telling as it enables branching into
sub-stories, but also allows the malicious user to immerse himself within the
challenge provided by the platform. In order to increase the deception aspect of
the platform, the narrative follows the intrinsic motivation of a malicious user.
Furthermore, the narrative must be plausible, as different network architecture
may have different vulnerabilities and rewards, and hence, intrinsic motivations.
Furthermore, narratives must cultivate the curiosity of the malicious user as the
story unfolds, it is therefore important to align the narrative to the gamification
aspect of the platform. To this end, the platform provides a believable chain
of events based on potential cyber-attacks and vulnerabilities induced within
the systems as scenarios. The stories provided by the platform are linear, and
constructed retrospectively, in order to avoid mismatches between the vulnera-
bilities, the gamification, the rewards and the narrative.
The gamification and reward fully inform the narrative, guiding the malicious
user to its next step. While the malicious user can perform an infinite number
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of action, he is unable to influence the outcome of the game without following
the path laid out.
2.3 Manipulation
A unique approach to deceive and mislead users is through manipulation. Ma-
nipulation can be defined as the action of controlling someone at your advantage.
Manipulation can take different forms as explored by Buss [6]. In his study, Buss
reported 12 different manipulation techniques used in close relationships and
interactional context. We identified 7 techniques to work with our deception
platform, each leading the malicious user to perform an action at our advantage
to either follow the story or to follow another path (i.e. target).
Coercion is the practice of making someone perform a forced action by using
threat or force. Through data gathering, and behavioural analysis an operator
is able to modify the narrative and gamification element relating to a specific
malicious user, enabling to display coercive error message, forcing the hacker to
follow any other pre-defined given path.
Reciprocity Reward are provided through a flexible narrative. As aforementioned,
the platform can be used to monitor the actions of a malicious user. In order
to evaluate the user’s competencies, the platform requires manual vulnerabili-
ties testing, hence, the gamification engine provides reciprocal rewards to users
that are not using vulnerabilities scanners. Enabling them to continue further
discovering key elements within the deceptive environment.
Debasement is the practice of lowering values, to manipulate someone. While un-
able to work on the emotions of the malicious user, the narrative is able changes
by analysing the attacks performed. Vulnerabilities can be loaded in a round
robin fashion, in order to keep the malicious user entertained, and therefore ex-
hibit less difficulties. Debasing the platform challenges ensures the continuation
of the story and thus the immersion of the malicious user within the deceptive
game.
Charm focuses on complimenting someone in order to perform an action. As the
platform and the narrative require a logical and believable construct, charming
the malicious user is only done through subtle clues, such as comments on the
“ability” of a malicious user in code running on the client-side. Those charming
“comments” help the user follow the pre-defined path, while believing to follow
this path through is own free will.
Pleasure Induction is the ability of demonstrating that an unwanted action can
be pleasurable for the malicious user. This is provided by the ability to debase
specific vulnerabilities enabling the malicious user to continue is progression
through the deceptive platform and earn rewards.
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Social Comparison is the act of comparing the malicious user against other
hackers or groups. Due to the nature of the platform, obvious comparisons such
as leaderboard would annihilate the immersive element of the platform. To this
end, comments on client-side and defacing pages are hidden. Website defacement
is an attack that changes the appearance of a website, often accompanied by the
name of the defacers or the group of defacers. This subtle clue, enables to create
a social comparison between the malicious user and other groups or hackers.
Monetary Rewards are core of some scenarios to deceive the hacker. The narra-
tive builds upon potential credit cards, or valuable information available at the
end of the quest, hence leading the attacker to follow the narrative to obtain a
potential monetary reward.
2.4 Gratification
Luring a malicious user into deception requires to foster its curiosity, in this
manuscript, we use gratification to trigger a pleasurable emotional reaction
within the malicious user, in order to lure him to perform key deceptive ac-
tions. By providing the malicious user, with credit card information, rewards,
or key information, we lead the action of the user towards a specific path or
target predefined within the platform. The gratification inherently focuses on
increasing the deceptive action of the platform.
3 Platform Architecture
This section provides an overview of the deceptive platform architecture. We
developed a fully extendable gamification architecture allowing researchers to
deploy virtualised hosts on both local networks and the internet. Each virtualised
hosts contains a set of specific vulnerability (i.e. web application, software, buffer
overflow, etc). Each host is connected to a game engine, an interaction engine
and a scoring engine.
Figure 2 depicts the logical architecture of the platform. When a hacker
connects to one or more virtual hosts, he is unable to differentiate it from a
real-world computer (i.e. running a windows operating system), this is achieved
by using port-scanning deception enabling to camouflage the signature of the
operating system.
All interactions with the host(s) including time, behavioural data (i.e. Keystroke
dynamics, activity tracking, etc.), and engagement are further recorded and pro-
cessed by the game and the scoring engines. This allows the hacker to be served
with polymorphic vulnerabilities which, in turn, can increase or decrease their
difficulties over time, keeping the hacker engaged with the platform. Further-
more, Figure 2 shows that the interaction information gathered through the
host(s) is fed to the scoring engine, which provides the hacker with rewards
based on pre-defined scenarios. Using a threshold measures, the hacker’s inter-
est is further analysed. If his interest scores below threshold, subtle clues are




























Fig. 2. Logical Architecture of the Deception Framework
provided to the hacker. The clues are inbuilt in each scenario. The clues vary
from wireshark captures, to misleading network scans and vulnerability scans.
The clues enable the hacker to seamlessly continue his malicious activity on the
the network by following a pre-defined path, without suspecting interacting with
a virtual environment. The path leads to data being gathered on the attacks,
techniques and tools used by hackers to solve each challenges thrown at him.
All the gathered information are further analyzed using a circular methodology,
enabling the operators to enhance the game engine and the variability of the
difficulties.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the deception framework network architec-
ture. The network can be extended through the Software Defined Network (SDN)
controller, enabling an operator to create virtual networks on demand. Informa-
tion are pulled from the vulnerability database to populate the virtualised hosts
running on the virtualised deception host server. Based on the scenario being
launched, different network architectures, virtual hosts and vulnerabilities are
loaded and spawned on the network. Hacker interactions are made through a
load balancer and a Django web server for all web vulnerabilities.




















Fig. 3. Network the Deception Framework
4 Scenarios
4.1 Scenario 1: Shopping Website
77% of web applications have been reported to include a vulnerable JavaScript
library enabling malicious users to take advantage of the website and potentially
use this vulnerability to launch further attacks. The scenario was evaluated on
its own, to identify the state of the narrative, the value of the kernels within the
narrative, and the deception, manipulation and gamification aspects.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the deception narrative. The shopping web-
site offers potential monetary rewards if hacked through credit cards stored in
the database. To this this end, 4 apparent vulnerabilities were created. I) A
“robot.txt” wile containing the path to an unprotected administration page.
II) A “JavaScript password checker” library included within the “index.html”
page enabling the hacker to bypass the login and password requirements. III)
A “Login SQL Injection” enabling the hacker to use an SQL injection against
the password field to gain access to the administration page. IV) A persistent
cross-site scripting (XSS) injection vulnerability.
Through subtle clues, within the code, comments, etc. . . , the attacker is lead to
believe that the website is vulnerable. His interested is further piqued through the
manipulation techniques as shown on the edges of Figure 4. By following the XSS
injection vulnerability, the malicious user will quickly discover planted comments
from other imaginary hackers, acting as a leaderboard and creating a social
comparison between the abilities of the imaginary hackers and the malicious
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Fig. 4. Web Deception Narrative
user. Furthermore, by following the first 3 vulnerabilities, the hacker will access
an unprotected administration page, which, in turn, will give him access to a
“database.db” file containing fabricated credit card numbers and associated CSV
numbers. Another file provides information about another shopping website,
which simulate similar vulnerabilities with a different design, misleading the
hacker to follow another path.
4.2 Scenario 2: Vulnerable FTP
The second scenario is built around a vulnerable version of an FTP application.
The FTP contains default credentials enabling a malicious user to read and
upload new data on the FTP. The premise of this scenario is to reward the
hacker upfront to provide direct gratification.
Figure 5 illustrates the different path the malicious user is able to take. Provid-
ing upfront gratification, with clear planted rewards enable to build the momen-
tum of the narrative. The first file is a database file containing various tables and
information. The file contains 2GB of data, requiring the hacker to spend time
analysing and searching for potential information. Within the file, numerous ref-
erences to a vulnerable WordPress website are made. The link to a defaced page
is also provided. The WordPress website is itself vulnerable to SQL injection and
XSS attacks and aims at comparing the malicious user skills with the skills of an
imaginary planted hacker. The second vulnerability provides the malicious user
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Fig. 5. FTP Deception Narrative
with a large Nmap scan of numerous machine. One is identified as vulnerable.
Upon exploiting the vulnerability the malicious user is able to perform a privi-
lege escalation through a buffer overflow attack (All buffer overflow protections
are disabled).
4.3 Scenario 3: IoT Network Combination
This scenario builds upon Scenario 1 and 2, by integrating them into a vulnera-
ble IoT Network running MQTT nodes. The aggregation of scenarios enable to
construct a plausible interactive deception environment, leading the malicious
user towards predefined targets and exhaust his skills against known vulnera-
ble nodes allowing operators to segregate the network, essentially, exploiting the
malicious user for the benefit of data gathering.
Figure 6 provides an overview of the vulnerable IoT network. One front facing
vulnerable IoT device running MQTT uses weak SSH credentials. The device
itself contains a file with un-encrypted SSH credentials for a vulnerable “broker
server”. The root of the broker contains an NMAP Scan which has for objective
to lead the malicious user towards the vulnerable devices analysed. The scan
contains information about 7 nodes in total. One vulnerable webserver, one vul-
nerable FTP and 5 IoT nodes with weak credentials but advertised within the
NMAP scan as no port open and secured. Using Nmap as an “authority figure”
to mislead the user into selecting another proposed target.
5 Evaluation
The platform was built against distinctive scenarios evaluating the narrative, the
gamification and the manipulation aspects of the platform. Leading the attacker
on a pre-defined path for deception.
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Fig. 6. IoT Network Deception Narrative
All deception environments have been launched front facing the internet using
four different locations (Atlanta, Lyon, London, and Tokyo) for 2 weeks. All
interactions with the environment were recorded and the path of the hackers
where analysed for each environment. For consistency, all environments were
reset at midnight (local time). The path taken by malicious users accessing dif-
ferent systems are recorded using their IP addresses. Furthermore, all malicious
users following a path on a predefined scenario have been aggregated.
Figure 7 shows the path followed by malicious users while interacting with
the interactive deception web Scenario. A total of 230 users accessed the platform
over a period of two weeks. 53.9% of the users did not succeed into accessing
the administrative web page, note that in this case no distinctions are made
between potential legitimate users and unsuccessful malicious users and bots.
13.4% of malicious users tried XSS injection, but only 0.86% resulted in a suc-
cessful persistent XSS injection. 3.9% of the users accessed the “robots.txt” file
and only 0.86% further accessed the administrator webpage. A surprising result,
as this clue was created for debasement purpose (i.e. enabling easy access to the
second stage). 24.3% of malicious users performed an SQL attack against the
website, however only 23.9% succeeded into accessing the administrator page.
4.34% accessed the JavaScript library, however, only 1.73% of users made it to
the administrator page. All users having access to the administrator webpage
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Fig. 7. Website Flow Narrative
accessed the database file, however, 21% of the successful users went on to at-
tacking the second deceptive website.
While the drop-out rate is high, 46% of users carried out at least one attack,
with a total of 27.9% carrying out a successful attack. The average time spend by
user 29.6 minutes. The flows presented in Figure 7 indicate a successful narrative,
as successful users tried to proceed with an attack on a pre-defined path, the
drop-outs at various stages are indicated by a lack of motivation (i.e. potential
gratification) or a lack of skills.
Figure 8 illustrates the path taken by malicious users during their interaction
with the interactive deception FTP Scenario. A total of 789 IP addresses were
recorded trying to access the FTP over a two week period. 20.7% malicious
users successfully logged on the FTP server. 67% of successful users accessed the
“Database.DB” file, further leading them to access a planted vulnerable website.
66.36% carried out an SQL attack against the website, while 2.72% carried out an
XSS attack. 12.8% of the successful users (at the first stage) accessed the NMAP
scan, but none of them carried out any attacks against the vulnerable virtual
machine. However 20.12% of the malicious users (at the first stage) accessed
the “confidential.csv” containing, fake names, credit card numbers and CSV
numbers.
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Fig. 8. FTP Flow Narrative
The primary assumption for the high-drop off at the first stage is due to the
number of bots that scanned the FTP and abandoned. The low number reported
to access the “confidential.csv” file is believed to be due to the too obvious name
of the file, hence leading malicious users onto pursuing the “database.DB” file
and executing SQL and XSS attacks against the website. Malicious users spend
an average time of 9.36 minutes on the platform.
Figure 9 shows the path taken by malicious users when interacting with the
combined environment, through an IoT vulnerable device sending MQTT re-
quests to a vulnerable broker. Out of the 1,084 individual IP recorded 66.88%
of requests made to the IoT platform were unsuccessful. 33.11% of attacks suc-
ceeded into accessing the IoT virtual sensor by identifying the weak credential
uses, however, only 10.8% of the successful users where able to connect to the
broker. 100% of the users accessing the broker (stage 3) accessed the Nmap file
stored at the root. 2.59% of the successful malicious user accessing the nmap file,
attacked the nodes stated as non-vulnerable in the Nmap scan, and successfully
accessed the 5 nodes. 56.4 % of the users reacted to the misleading information
and attacked either the website or the FTP. All malicious users that proceeded
to stage 4 performed successful attacks against the deceptive targets. 43.5% also
dropped off at stage 3 after having accessed the Nmap file. It is expected that
the drop off, might be due to a lack of reward at this stage, clarity in reading the
Nmap file provided or a lack of time. The malicious users spend an average time
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Fig. 9. IoT Flow Narrative
of 41.3 minutes on the deceptive scenario demonstrating a successful, believable
narrative, fostering curiosity.
6 Related Works
McQueen et al. [15] introduced deception defenses in control systems. They de-
fined security through seven abstract concepts, and further defined deception
solutions for each abstract security concept. The concepts and associated decep-
tion are provided in the form of a broad taxonomy. Heckman et al. [11] review the
January 2012 real-time red/blue team wargame experiment by MITRE, which
included deception at its core, in order to fool and deceive red teams. The main
focus of the deception system in place was to simulate a command and control
system, which in turn would provide false information to the read team through
a fake interface. The system presented by the authors was specifically designed
with a wargame in mind, and while proving its efficacy, the system lacks flexibil-
ity in order to be deployed in a broader context (i.e. IoT, SME Networks, SCADA
Systems, Web, etc. . . ). In [19] Stech et al. provide a scientometric analysis of the
concepts of deception detection in cyber space. The authors demonstrated that
the social, behavioral and cognitive aspects of deception where often discarded
from the denial and deception tactics used. They also highlighted a lack of termi-
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nology to describe deception and classified deception as an emerging field within
cyber-security.
7 Discussion and Limitations
This section introduces the key takeaways of the interactive deception platform
as well as the limitations of the platform in its current state.
7.1 Key Takeaways
– Increased Interaction: The platform enables malicious users to interact
with numerous believable components and focuses on increasing the interac-
tion time between the malicious user and the components.
– Chronological Events: The platform builds on the concepts of gamifica-
tion and narrative, hence, unfolds in a time line fashion.
– Deflection: The use of gamification, manipulation, gratification and narra-
tive have demonstrated to be successful in order to deflect attacks from key
network components to secondary nodes, or towards the dedicated virtual
environment.
– Platform Flexibility: The platform is modular and hence enables to fit,
and build on numerous scenarios.
7.2 Limitations
– Scenario Complexity: Complex environments may require complex sce-
narios, which may clutter the environments. Furthermore, building believable
scenarios and a plausible narrative is time consuming.
– Distinguishing between legitimate and malicious users: In its current
state the platform is unable to distinguish between users, hence limiting the
interaction of the environment with legitimate users.
8 Conclusion
In this paper a successful interactive deception platform based on gamification,
narrative, manipulation and gratification techniques is presented. The platform is
highly modular and enable users to develop and deploy scenarios to mislead and
deceive malicious users on a network, to safeguard key elements of the network,
buy time for security operators to isolate the deceptive nodes and malicious user,
or to collect and study the behaviour of malicious users. We have also presented
a comprehensive model to increase the interaction with deceptive platform. The
techniques can easily be transferred across to existing platform. Furthermore, the
scenarios presented are based on a plausible narrative encouraging and coercing
the user into exploring the environment. In this paper 3 scenarios were presented,
demonstrating the efficiency of the the narrative, manipulative and gratificative
components. It was demonstrated that while 2103 individual connection to the
platform were recorded over the three scenarios and a high initial drop-out rate,
over 75% of users engaging with the platform carry at least one successful attack.
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